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ABROGATION OR REGULATION? HOW ANDERSON V.
EVANS DISCARDS THE MAKAH'S TREATY WHALING
RIGHT IN THE NAME OF CONSERVATION NECESSITY
Zachary Tomlinson
Abstract: From 1787 to 1871, the federal government and various Indian tribes entered
into hundreds of treaties. Under well-established U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the U.S.
Congress has plenary authority to abrogate or modify any of these treaties. The U.S. Supreme
Court is reluctant to find congressional intent to do so, however, and requires that this intent
be clear and plain. States have no such power to qualify treaties, but the Court has allowed
states to regulate treaty rights when doing so is necessary for species conservation. While the
U.S. Supreme Court has kept these two lines of cases distinct, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has merged the two doctrines in recent years. The Ninth Circuit's recent
decision in Anderson v. Evans, in which the court held that the Marine Mammal Protection
Act (MMPA) applied to the Makah Tribe's treaty whaling rights, dramatically illustrates this
practice. This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit's conflation of federal treaty abrogation
principles with state conservation necessity principles is analytically indefensible and in
direct contravention to established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Under correctly applied
U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Makah's treaty whaling right is not subject to the MMPA.
The Anderson decision is a violation of the United States' treaty obligation to the Makah
Tribe and should be overturned.

Long before gray whales were hunted to the brink of extinction in the
early 1900s, the animals were central to the cultural, spiritual, and
economic existence of the Makah Tribe.' Until the 1930s, the Makah
hunted gray whales in the waters off the northwest coast of present-day

Washington State. Nowhere is the Makah's connection with the gray
whale better illustrated than in the 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay,3 in which

the Tribe ceded most of its land in part for the right to take whales "at
usual and accustomed grounds and stations.., in common with all

1.See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 363 (W.D. Wash. 1974) ("The Makah
Indians, prior to treaty times, were primarily a seafaring people who spent their lives either on the
water or close to the shore. Most of their subsistence came from the sea where they fished for
salmon, halibut and other fish, and hunted for whale and seal. The excess of what they needed for
their own consumption was traded to other tribes for many of the raw materials and some of the
finished articles used in the daily and ceremonial life of the village."), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1975).
2. See Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002); Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135,
1137 (9th Cir. 2000).
3. Treaty of Neah Bay, Jan. 31, 1855, U.S.-Makah Tribe, 12 Stat. 939. Neah Bay is located in the
north-westernmost comer of present-day Washington State, on the Olympic Peninsula.
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citizens of the United States."4 In fact, the Makah is the only tribe in the
United States with an explicit treaty right to hunt whales.5 However, a
recent ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
severely limited the ability of the Makah Tribe to exercise this right.6 In
Anderson v. Evans,7 the court held that the Marine Mammal Protection
Act (MMPA),8 which generally prohibits the taking of marine mammals,
applied to the Makah's whaling efforts. 9 Without ruling that Congress
had abrogated the Makah's treaty whaling right, the court held that the
application of the MMPA to the Tribe's whaling efforts was necessary to
achieve the statute's "conservation purpose."' 0
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress has
plenary power to abrogate or modify Indian treaties." However, because
the federal government and the tribes negotiated the treaties in
conditions severely disadvantageous to the Indian tribes, the Court has
created canons of Indian treaty construction that favor Indian tribes and
protect treaty rights.' 2 Foremost among these canons is the principle that
congressional intent to abrogate3 a treaty right must be clear and plain,
and will not be easily imputed.'
States, on the other hand, have no such power to abrogate or modify
Indian treaties." 4 By virtue of the Supremacy Clause,' 5 Indian treaties
take precedence over any conflicting state laws.' 6 Nonetheless, in
deference to the police power of the states, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that states can regulate Indian treaty fishing rights when doing so is
necessary for conservation.' 7 However, courts are reluctant to find such
"conservation necessity" in state regulations.'8

4. Id. art. 4, 12 Stat. at 940a.
5. See Metcalf,214 F.3d at 1140.
6. Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2002).

7. 314 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002).
8. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (2000).
9. Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1028-29.
10. Id.
1I.See, e.g., Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903).
12, See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 222-23 (1982).
13. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (citing COHEN, supra note 12, at 223).
14. See COHEN, supra note 12, at 458-62.
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.

16. Id.
17. See Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968) [hereinafter Puyallup 1].
18. See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 653 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1981) (stating that treaty
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This Note argues that in Anderson v. Evans, the Ninth Circuit erred in
using the conservation necessity doctrine to hold that the Makah Tribe is
subject to the MMPA, a federal statute. This error is a direct result of the
court's previous conflation of two analytically distinct U.S. Supreme
Court doctrines: treaty abrogation principles, properly applied only in
cases involving federal abrogation or modification of treaty rights; and
the conservation necessity principle, properly applied only in cases
involving state regulation of treaty rights. Part I of this Note reviews the
development and rationale behind each doctrine. Part II examines the
Ninth Circuit's combination of these two doctrines and notes the
rejection of this approach in other circuits. Part III discusses the Ninth
Circuit's recent affirmation and extension of this approach in Anderson.
Finally, Part IV argues that in Anderson, the Ninth Circuit improperly
analyzed the impact of the MMPA on the Makah's treaty whaling right.
Under a proper abrogation analysis, the Makah are not subject to the
provisions of the MMPA because there is no indication that Congress, in
passing the statute, intended to modify or abrogate the Makah's treaty
right to hunt whales. Using the conservation necessity doctrine as a
substitute for abrogation analysis in the context of federal legislation is
doctrinally inexplicable and unprecedented in U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence. The Ninth Circuit's Anderson decision is a violation of
the United States' treaty obligation to the Makah, and should be
overturned.
I.

THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL AND STATE POWER OVER
INDIAN TREATY RIGHTS: TWO DIFFERENT RATIONALES,
TWO DIFFERENT ANALYSES

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that both the U.S. Congress and the
states have some ability to limit the exercise of Indian treaty rights.' 9
The nature of the federal and state powers is fundamentally different,
however, and developed in two distinct lines of cases.2 0 Congress has
plenary power to modify or abrogate treaty rights; the focus of a judicial
inquiry is on whether Congress intended to do so in a specific instance. 21
In contrast, states have only a limited ability to affect Indian treaty
rights may be regulated only upon showing that unregulated treaty fishing would cause "irreparable
harm" to fisheries within state).
19. See infra Part L.A-B.
20. See infra Part L.A-B.
21. See infra Part I.A.
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rights. 22 Among other restrictions, courts insist that state regulations be
23
reasonable and necessary for conservation purposes.
A.

Although Congress Has PlenaryPower To Modify or Abrogate
Indian Treaties, Its Intent To Do So Must Be Clearand Plain

As a result of its plenary authority over Indian affairs, Congress has
the power to statutorily abrogate or modify Indian treaties. 24 Courts
strongly presume, however, that federal statutes of general applicability
do not automatically affect Indian treaty rights.2 5 Instead, prior to
concluding that a congressional act affects a treaty right, courts must
find that Congress considered the Indian treaty right in question and
subsequently chose to abrogate or modify the right by passing the
statute.26
The U.S. Supreme Court offered one of its strongest expressions of
the presumption against treaty abrogation in Menominee Tribe of Indians
v. United States.27 The Court held that a 1954 statute terminating the
trust relationship with the Menominee Tribe 28 did not extinguish the
Tribe's hunting and fishing treaty rights.29 While the statute provided
that "all statutes of the United States which affect Indians because of
their status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to the members of

22. See infra Part l.B.
23. See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
24. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903). However, as later cases have
clarified, the exercise of such power would likely subject the United States to a takings claim under
the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413
(1968).
25. See COHEN, supra note 12, at 222-23. In Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian
Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "general Acts of Congress apply to
Indians as well as to all others in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary." Id. at 120.
However, Tuscarora was not a treaty rights case, and, as the Ninth Circuit has noted, the Tuscarora
rule "does not apply to Indians if the application of the general statute would be in derogation of the
Indians' treaty rights." Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1982).
26. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986).
27. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
28. Menominee Termination Act of 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (repealed 1973) (formerly
codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (1970)).
29. Menominee, 391 U.S. at 412-13. The Menominee Tribe's hunting and fishing rights were not
explicitly granted by treaty. See Treaty of Wolf River, May 12, 1854, U.S.-Menominee Tribe, 10
Stat. 1064. However, the Court held that the treaty language reserving for the Tribe a home "to be
held as Indian lands are held" included the right to hunt and fish. See Menominee, 391 U.S. at 40506.
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the tribe, 3 ° the Court held that the use of the word "statutes" was
"potent evidence" that treaty rights remained unaffected. 31 Reaffirming
the principle that "the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to
be lightly imputed to the Congress, ' 32 the majority refused to construe
' 33 way of abrogating the Menominee's
the statute as a "backhanded
34
rights.
fishing
hunting and
While the Menominee decision was a strong statement about the
importance of treaty rights, it did not establish whether Congress' intent
to abrogate a treaty must be explicit in the language of the statute. The
Court addressed this question in United States v. Dion,35 holding that
there must be "clear evidence that Congress actually considered the
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty
rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the
treaty. 36 Congressional intent to abrogate can be found in either the
language of the statute or from "clear and reliable evidence in the
legislative history of a statute. 37
In Dion, the state convicted Dwight Dion, Sr., a member of the
Yankton Sioux Tribe, of shooting four bald eagles on the Tribe's
reservation in South Dakota in violation of both the Eagle Protection
Act 38 and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 39 In his defense, Dion
asserted his treaty right to hunt eagles for noncommercial purposes.40
Rejecting Dion's treaty defense, the Court first reasoned that the
language of the Eagle Protection Act strongly suggested congressional
intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights to take eagles. 4' Although the
30. Menominee Termination Act of 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250, 252 (repealed 1973) (formerly
codified at 25 U.S.C. §899 (1970)) (emphasis added).
31. Menominee, 391 U.S. at 412.
32. Id. at 412-13 (citing Pigeon River, Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934)).
33. Id. at413.
34. Id. The Court also felt it unlikely that Congress would have intentionally subjected the federal
government to a claim for compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Id.
35. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
36. Id. at 739-40.
37. Id. at 739 (quoting COHEN, supra note 12, at 223).
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668a-668d (2000). The Eagle Protection Act, as originally enacted, only applied
to bald eagles. However, in 1962, the protections were extended to golden eagles as well. See
Golden Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (1962) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
668a (2000)).
39. 16 U.S.C.

§§

1531-1544 (2000); Dion, 476 U.S. at 735-36.

40. Dion, 476 U.S. at 737-38.

41. Id. at 745. The Court found that it did not need to consider whether the ESA abrogated Dion's
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Eagle Protection Act contained no language that explicitly mentioned
abrogation of Indian treaty rights,42 the Court noted that the Eagle
Protection Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue permits to
Indian tribes for the taking of eagles for "religious purposes.

43

The

Court noted that such language was powerful evidence that Congress
considered the treaty rights and subsequently chose to abrogate them. a4
In addition, the Dion Court looked to the legislative history of the
Eagle Protection Act.45 The original version of the statute, passed in
1940, only applied to bald eagles and contained no explicit references to
Indians.4 6 In 1962, however, Congress extended the statute's
prohibitions to golden eagles and instituted the permitting process
described above. 47 The amendment reflected an "unmistakable and
explicit legislative policy choice" that unregulated Indian hunting of
bald eagles was inconsistent with the need for species preservation. 48 As
a whole, the legislative history provided additional evidence that
Congress considered the treaty right of all tribes to take eagles and chose
to abrogate those rights.49
The Court has applied the Dion framework in two subsequent cases.
In South Dakota v. Bourland,5 ° the Court cited the Dion test with
approval in holding that Congress abrogated the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe's treaty right to "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of
former tribal trust lands when it acquired the lands from the Tribe for a
dam and flood control project.5t In acquiring the lands, Congress
explicitly reserved the right of the Tribe to hunt and fish around the
newly created reservoir "subject to the regulations governing the
corresponding use by other citizens of the United States. 52 Following

treaty rights because the Eagle Protection Act had already removed his "treaty shield." Id. at 74546.
42. Id. at 740-41.
43. Id. at 740 (quoting Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2000)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 740-44.
46. See Eagle Protection Act, § 1, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668a-668d
(2000)).
47. Dion, 476 U.S. at 741.
48. ld. at 745.
49. Id. at 743.
50. 508 U.S. 679, 693-94 (1993).

51. Id. at 693.
52. Id. at 690 (citing Cheyenne River Act of Sept. 3, 1954, 68 Stat. 1191, 1193 (1954)).
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Dion, the Court held that such a limited reservation of rights could not
be explained without finding that Congress intended to abrogate the right
of the Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing on the land by non-Indians.5 3
Most recently, in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians,54 the Court again cited the Dion test with approval in holding
that there was no "clear evidence" that Congress intended to abrogate
Chippewa treaty rights in passing Minnesota's Enabling Act.5 ' The
Court noted that the Act made no mention of Indian treaty rights, and
provided "no clue that Congress considered the reserved rights of the
Chippewa and decided to abrogate those rights when it passed the
Act.",56 Both Bourland and Mille Lacs illustrate the continued vitality of
the Dion framework.
Thus, U.S. Supreme Court precedent weighs heavily against the
finding of congressional intent to abrogate treaty rights. 57 Under Dion,
the Court requires evidence that Congress considered the treaty right in
58
question and nonetheless chose to modify or abrogate that right. While

the intention to abrogate treaty rights need not be explicit on the face of
a statute, evidence of abrogation must be "clear and plain" in light of the
"fundamental importance" of Indian treaty rights. 59
B.

States CannotModify or Abrogate Indian Treaty Rights, but They
Have a Limited Ability To Regulate Off-Reservation Treaty Rights
When Necessaryfor Conservation

By virtue of the Supremacy Clause,6 ° Indian treaties are superior to
conflicting state laws or constitutional provisions. 6 1 As a result, states do
not have the ability to qualify the rights guaranteed in Indian treaties.62

53. Id. at 693-94. While the Court analyzed the abrogation issue under the Dion framework, the
Court's holding of abrogation provoked a strong dissent. See id. at 700 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(stating that the "majority adopts precisely the sort of reasoning-by-implication that [Dion and other
cases] reject").
54. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).

55. Id. at 203.
56. Id.
57. See COHEN, supra note 12, at 222-23.
58. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986).

59. Id.
60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.

61. See COHEN, supra note 12, at 62.
62. See, e.g., Puyallup 1,391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968) (stating that a treaty right to fish at all usual
and accustomed places "may, of course, not be qualified by the State").

1107

Washington Law Review

Vol. 78:1101, 2003

However, in recognition of the potential effects of a treaty on a state's
police powers, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that states do have the

power to regulate off-reservation Indian fishing rights when necessary
for conservation.6 3
The Court first recognized the ability of states to regulate Indian
treaty fishing rights for purposes of conservation in 1968.64 In Puyallup
Tribe v. Department of Game (Puyallup ),65the Court held that offreservation Indian treaty fishing rights were subject to limited state
regulation. 66 At issue in the case was the ability of Washington State to
enforce regulations banning net fishing of steelhead and salmon by the
Puyallup Tribe.67 The Court first reasoned that the Puyallup's treaty6 8
guaranteed the Tribe the right to fish at its "usual and accustomed
' 69
places," but not the right to fish in its "usual and accustomed manner.
Furthermore, the Court noted that the off-reservation fishing right was
not an exclusive one, but rather one held in common with all citizens of
Washington Territory. 70 The Court held that the terms of the treaty
preserved "the overriding police power of the State" to enact

63. See id. The regulation of on-reservation Indian treaty rights is beyond the scope of this Note
as the Makah's treaty whaling right is an off-reservation right held "in common with the citizens of
the territory." In general, the justification for allowing the regulation of off-reservation treaty rights
lies primarily in the non-exclusive nature of such rights, indicated by the "in common" language of
many Indian treaties. However, in at least one case, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied this same
rationale to state regulation of on-reservation treaty rights, which are otherwise exclusive rights
according to the terms of the treaties. See Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 173-77
(1977).
64. See Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. at 398. Prior to 1968, the Court had only indirectly addressed
whether states could regulate Indian treaty rights. See, e.g., Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681,
684-85 (1942) (holding that the state of Washington could not charge treaty fishermen a fee to
exercise "the very right their ancestors intended to reserve," but noting in dicta that the state could
impose "purely regulatory" restrictions on Indian treaty rights to the extent "necessary for the
conservation of fish"); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 (1905) (holding that treaty
fishermen had an easement to cross and use private land in the exercise of their treaty fishing rights,
but noting in dicta that treaty did not "restrain the state unreasonably, if at all, in the regulation of
the right").
65. 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
66. See id. at 398. The case arose when the Washington Department of Game brought suit against
two Indian tribes to prevent them from fishing in violation of a blanket ban on the use of net fishing
in Washington territorial waters, applicable to both Indians and non-Indians. Id. at 395-96, 400.
67. Id. at 395-96.
68. Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132.
69. Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. at 398 (quoting Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra note 68, art. 3, 10 Stat.
at 1133).
70. Id.
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nondiscriminatory measures to conserve fish resources.7 The Court
described this new conservation necessity standard, and its limitations,
in the following terms:
The right to fish "at all usual and accustomed" places may, of
course, not be qualified by the State ....But the manner of
fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial
fishing, and the like may be regulated by the State in the interest
of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate
standards and does not discriminate against the Indians. 72
The Court has developed these limitations on state regulation in
subsequent cases. To show that regulation of treaty rights meets
"appropriate standards," the state must demonstrate that the regulation is
a "reasonable and necessary conservation measure, and that its
73
application to the Indians is necessary in the interest of conservation.,
Moreover, the principle of non-discrimination also guarantees treaty
fishermen an actual share of the harvestable fish, and not just the mere
opportunity to fish on the same terms as other citizens.74 For example,
the second Puyallup case to reach the Court, Department of Game v.
Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup 11),75 directly addressed whether a state
steelhead fishing regulation prohibiting net fishing met the Puyallup I
standard.76 Although the regulation was facially neutral, the Court found
that it had the effect of banning all tribal steelhead fishing, and was thus

71. Id. Commentators have suggested that the Puyallup I decision was grounded more on a fear
that the salmon would be fished to extinction, rather than on any principled legal basis. See Ralph
W. Johnson, The States Versus Indian OffReservation Fishing: A United States Supreme Court
Error,47 WASH. L. REV. 207, 208 (1972) ("No valid basis for the existence of such state power can
be found ....The treaties with the Indians do not provide for state regulation and Congress has
never authorized such regulation.").
72. Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. at 398 (quoting Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra note 68, art. 3, 10 Stat.
at 1133).
73. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (citing Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S.
44 (1973) [hereinafter Puyallup 11];
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942)).
74. See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
676-79 (1979).
75. 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
76. Id. at 48-49. Under Washington law at the time, the Department of Fisheries regulated
salmon fishing, while the Department of Game regulated steelhead fishing. After the Puyallup I
decision, the Department of Fisheries changed its blanket prohibition against salmon net fishing to
allow Indian net fishing in certain areas of the Puyallup River. Id. at 46. The Department of Game,
however, maintained its blanket prohibition of steelhead net fishing in the River, and it was this
regulation that the Puyallup Tribe contested in PuyallupH. Id.
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discriminatory.77 The Court refined this line of reasoning in Washington
78
v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass 'n,
holding that Indians would have understood the treaty term "taking fish
in common with all citizens of the Territory" to guarantee the tribes an
actual share of the fish.79
Lower courts have interpreted the scope of a state's conservation
necessity power quite narrowly. Some courts have required a showing of
imminent species extinction, 8c and all have required proof of substantial
species peril. 8' Further, some lower courts have also concluded that
states cannot regulate for purposes of conservation when other, less
restrictive means are available, such as existing tribal self-regulation.
For example, in United States v. Washington,82 a district court required
the state to demonstrate that existing tribal regulation or enforcement
was "inadequate to prevent demonstrable harm to the actual
conservation of fish," and that other, less83 restrictive means or methods
could not achieve the conservation goals.
77. Id. at 48. The Court found that while the regulations allowed line and hook fishing by all
citizens, including Indians, such fishing was "entirely pre-empted by non-Indians," thus effectively
granting the entire steelhead run to non-Indian sports fishermen. Id. Thus, while the treaty fishing
rights did not give the Puyallup Tribe a right to "pursue the last living steelhead until it enters [its]
nets," the state did not have the power to regulate so as to deny the Puyallup a fair apportionment of
the steelhead in the river. Id.
78. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
79. Id. at 675-85. The Court noted that the premise that "each individual Indian would share an
'equal opportunity' with thousands of newly arrived individual settlers is totally foreign to the spirit
of the [treaty] negotiations." Id. The rights possessed by the Indians "are admittedly not 'equal,' but
are to some extent greater than, those afforded other citizens." Id. at 677. In practice, this has meant
a court-imposed allocation of fish between the interested treaty and non-treaty parties. See, e.g.,
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (holding that "in common"
off-reservation treaty fishing right entitled the Puyallup Tribe up to fifty percent of harvestable run
offish after allowing for escapement), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
80. See, e.g., Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 908 (D. Or. 1969) (holding that "conservation
necessity" required the state to show that the continued exercise of the unregulated treaty fishing
right would imperil the existence of the species).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 718 F.2d 299, 304-05 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that treaty
rights may be regulated only where necessary to preserve a "reasonable margin of safety" against
the imminence of extinction); United States v. Michigan, 653 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding
that treaty rights may be regulated only upon showing that unregulated treaty fishing would cause
"irreparable harm" to fisheries within state); Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. State, 92 Wash.
App. 381, 392, 966 P.2d 928, 934 (1998) (noting that state regulation of treaty fishing rights must
be "essential" to the conservation of fisheries).
82. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
83. Id. at 415; see also Mille Lacs Band v. Minnesota, 952 F. Supp. 1362, 1380 (D. Minn.)
(noting that state cannot regulate Indian treaty fishing if tribe "can effectively self-regulate and such
tribal regulations are sufficient to meet conservation needs"), aff'd, 124 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 1997),
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In sum, states have the ability to regulate tribal treaty rights to the
extent necessary for conservation. 84 In practice, however, courts have
required that states meet a formidable burden in showing the necessity of
such regulation. The state may not regulate to the extent that it denies the
treaty tribes an actual share of the harvestable resource-even where
conservation regulations are facially neutral. Furthermore, while the
state may not have to show that the species is subject to imminent
extinction, it must prove substantial species peril. Finally, the state must
also show that existing tribal self-regulation, or other, less restrictive
means or methods, is inadequate to achieve conservation.
II.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEVELOPS A NEW TREATY
ABROGATION STANDARD, BUT FINDS ITSELF ALONE

As the above cases illustrate, the U.S. Supreme Court has kept its
method of analyzing treaty abrogation cases (governed by the Dion
standard) 85 distinct from its review of state regulation of treaty rights
(governed by the Puyallup line of cases). 86 However, the Ninth Circuit
has combined the two methodologies, using state conservation necessity
principles to determine the effect of federal statutes on Indian treaty
rights.87 Most other courts have not adopted the Ninth Circuit's
methodology, instead requiring a "clear and plain" showing under Dion
that Congress considered the Indian treaty right in question and
subsequently chose to abrogate that right. 88
A.

The Ninth Circuit'sFederalConservationNecessity Standard

The U.S. Supreme Court has never used state conservation necessity
principles to analyze whether a federal statute has abrogated Indian
treaty rights. The Ninth Circuit, however, has done so on several
occasions, in a line of cases originating with United States v. Fryberg.89
aff'd, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Wisconsin, 668 F. Supp. 1233, 1236 (W.D.

Wis. 1987) (noting that state regulation of Indian treaty fishing must be the "least restrictive
alternative available").
84. See Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968).
85. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986); supra notes 23-57 and
accompanying text.
86. See supranotes 64-79 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 89-108 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
89. 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1980).
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In Fryberg, the court faced the same issue that was later addressed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Dion: whether the Eagle Protection Act
modified or abrogated treaty rights to take and kill bald eagles. 90 Using
reasoning different from that later adopted by the Dion Court, the Ninth
Circuit held that the application of the Eagle Protection Act to the treaty
91
rights was necessary to achieve the statute's "conservation purpose."
The Fryberg court noted that the statute did not itself indicate an
"unambiguous express intent" to abrogate or modify Indian treaty
rights.92 However, the court held that it was appropriate to look beyond
the language of the statute to the Eagle Protection Act's legislative
history and "surrounding circumstances" to help determine
congressional intent. 93 In particular, the Fryberg court held that such
"surrounding circumstances" could include the statute's inherent
"conservation purpose. 94 The court observed that the U.S. Supreme
Court, in the state regulatory context, had "long recognized that
reasonable and non-discriminatory conservation statutes implicitly affect
treaty rights to the extent necessary to achieve their conservation
purpose." 95 Looking to the Puyallup line of cases, the court established
the following test:
[R]easonable conservation statutes affect Indian treaty rights
when (1) the sovereign exercising its police power to conserve a
resource has jurisdiction in the area where the activity occurs;
(2) the statute applies in a non-discriminatory manner to both
treaty and non-treaty persons; and (3) the application of the
statute to treaty rights is necessary to achieve its conservation
purpose.96

90. Id. at 1014-16. Dean Fryberg, an enrolled member of the Tulalip Indian Tribe, had been
charged with the unlawful taking, shooting, and killing of a bald eagle in violation of the Eagle
Protection Act. Id. Fryberg contested the charges, asserting that he had a general on-reservation
right to hunt eagles under the Treaty of Point Elliot. Id.
91. Id. at 1016.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1013-14. The court noted that this was especially true in the case at hand, which did not
"involve the termination or diminishment of a reservation,... or the total extinguishment of hunting
and fishing rights, as in Menominee, or even a substantial infringement on fishing and hunting
rights." Id. at 1014. Rather, the case involved a "relatively insignificant" restriction on Fryberg's
treaty hunting rights. Id. The court noted that there was no evidence that the bald eagle had ever
"provided the Indian with any commercial benefit or had any subsistence value." Id.
95. Id. at 1014.
96. Id.at 1015.
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Applying this test to the Eagle Protection Act, the Fryberg court held
97
98
that there was federal jurisdiction,9 7 the statute
was non-discriminatory,
and application of the Eagle Protection Act to treaty rights was
necessary to effectuate the conservation purpose of the statute.99 The
court found that the purpose of the Eagle Protection Act was to prevent
the extinction of the bald eagle, and not "merely to conserve a
resource." 100 So precarious was the situation of the eagle that "all threats,
including takings pursuant
to Indian treaty, should be banned to assure
01
the species' survival."'
Prior to the recent Anderson v. Evans decision, only one Ninth Circuit
decision cited Fryberg for its use of the conservation necessity doctrine
03
02
in the treaty abrogation context.1 In United States v. Eberhardt,1
decided prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's adoption of the "actual
consideration and choice" test in Dion, the Ninth Circuit noted in dicta
the validity of the Fryberg analysis for interpreting the effect of
congressional statutes on Indian treaty rights.10 4 However, the Eberhardt
court overturned a district court decision'0 5 that applied the Fryberg
97. The Eagle Protection Act applied "within the United States or any place subject to the
jurisdiction thereof," including Indian reservations. Id.
98. The "sweeping language" of the Eagle Protection Act banned all threats to the bald eagles'
survival from both treaty and non-treaty persons. Id.
99. Id. at 1013.
100. Id. at 1015.
101. Id.
102. Shortly after the Dion decision, a federal district court in Nevada noted that Fryberg
precluded a treaty defense to a civil fine under the ESA. See United States v. Thirty Eight (38)
Golden Eagles or Eagle Parts, 649 F. Supp. 269, 280-81 (D.Nev. 1986). However, the court's
mention of Frybergwas dicta as it found that the tribal member had no treaty right to take eagles,
making the Fryberg analysis inapplicable. Id. at 281. Moreover, the district court was apparently
unaware of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent Dion decision as it noted only that the Court had
granted certiorari in the case. Id. at 280. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has invoked the conservation
necessity doctrine at least twice in treaty cases involving prosecutions under the Lacey Act. See
United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d
816, 823 (9th Cir. 1985). However, in both cases, the court analyzed the validity of the underlying
state wildlife conservation laws, on which prosecutions under the Lacey Act are based. In both
cases, the court did not cite to Fryberg, and instead relied solely on the Puyallup line of cases. See
Williams, 898 F.2d at 729; Sohappy, 770 F.2d at 823.
103. 789 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986).
104. The Eberhardtcourt consolidated review of two lower court decisions, both of which found
the Puyallup line of cases inapplicable when there was no risk of"imminent extinction." Id. at 1358.
105. Id. at 1358 (overturning United States v. Wilson, 611 F. Supp. 813 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(holding Department of Interior regulations invalid because the general trust statutes contained "no
reflection of the congressional intent necessary to abrogate reserved rights as required by
[Fryberg]")).
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analysis to administrative regulations affecting treaty fishing rights on
the Hoopa Valley Reservation in California.10 6 The Eberhardtcourt held
that Fryberg was inapplicable to regulations promulgated by the
Department of the Interior in its capacity as trustee for the tribes
occupying the reservation.10 7 Even though there was no evidence that
Congress considered treaty rights in authorizing the Department of the
Interior to promulgate fishing regulations, the court reasoned that the
regulations were designed to manage the reservation fisheries for the
"benefit of the Indians," and not to abrogate or modify any treaty
rights. 08
B.

Abrogation Analysis in Other Circuits

In general, other courts have not followed the Ninth Circuit in
incorporating the conservation necessity test into Indian treaty
abrogation jurisprudence. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Dion, the Circuits disagreed about whether courts must find
congressional intent to abrogate from the language of the statute, or
instead, like in Fryberg, could infer this intent from the "surrounding
circumstances" of the statute, such as the statute's "conservation
purpose."' 1 9 However, in the years since the Dion decision, no court
outside of the Ninth Circuit has cited Fryberg for its methodology.
Rather, these courts have generally relied on the Dion test and required
"clear and plain" evidence that Congress intended to abrogate treaty
1
rights. '
While courts outside the Ninth Circuit have not specifically cited
Fryberg for its reasoning, one federal district court has used the
"conservation necessity" doctrine in analyzing an Indian treaty
106. Id. at 1361-62.
107.
108.
109.
Indian

Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1361-62.
Compare, e.g., United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that
treaty abrogation must be "clearly expressed") with United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010,

1013 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that treaty abrogation could be inferred from legislative history and

surrounding circumstances, including effectuation of a general conservation purpose).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Gotchnik, 222 F.3d 506, 509-11 (8th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging
the Dion standard, but holding that the Bois Forte Band of Chippewa Indians' treaty right to hunt
and fish did not include right to use modem transportation methods in a designated wilderness area
while hunting and fishing); Oyler v. Allenbrand, 23 F.3d 292, 296 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that

there was "clear evidence" under the Dion standard that the Kansas Enabling Act abrogated the
Shawnee's individual criminal immunity, even though the Shawnee were not one of the four tribes

named in the Act).

1114

Abrogation or Regulation?
abrogation case."'1 In United States v. Billie, 1 2 the court ruled that the
Endangered Species Act abrogated the defendant's treaty right to hunt
panthers." 3 Citing the Puyallup line of cases, the court held that Indian
treaty rights "do not extend to the point of extinction," and that
"reasonable, nondiscriminatory" conservation measures may affect
Indian treaty rights to the extent necessary to ensure the continued
existence of a species." 14 Subsequent courts have not followed Billie, and
commentators have criticized the case for ignoring the Dion test. 115
III.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT REAFFIRMS THE FRYBERG
STANDARD IN ANDERSON V. EVANS

In Anderson v. Evans, the Ninth Circuit again used the conservation
necessity doctrine to analyze whether a federal statute had abrogated an
Indian treaty. In holding that the Makah's whaling efforts were subject
to the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 1 6 the court relied on the
conservation necessity standard it adopted more than twenty years
earlier in Fryberg.1 7 While it was unclear whether Fryberg was still
valid following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dion,l1 8 the
Anderson court, without citing the Dion decision, reaffirmed and
extended Fryberg'smethodology." 9

111. See United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1489-90 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
112. 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
113. Id.
at 1489-90.
114. Id.
115. See Robert Laurence, The Abrogation of Indian Treaties by Federal Statutes Protective of
the Environment, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 859, 868-86 (1991); Sally J. Johnson, Note, Honoring
Treaty Rights and Conserving Endangered Species After United States v. Dion, 13 PUB. LAND L.
REV. 179, 185-88 (1992); Robert J. Miller, Comment, Speaking with Forked Tongues: Indian
Treaties, Salmon, and the Endangered Species Act, 70 OR. L. REV. 543, 567-71 (1991). But see
Conrad A. Fjetland, Comment, The Endangered Species Act and Indian Treaty Rights: A Fresh
Look, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 45, 53-70 (1999) (arguing that the "legislative history, congressional
intent, and the public policy considerations behind passage of the ESA all lead to the conclusion that
the ESA abrogates Indian treaty rights where those rights are in conflict with endangered species
protection").
116. Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1029 (9th Cir. 2002).
117. Id. at 1026-29.
118. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986) (holding that it is "essential" that there
be "clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the
one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the
treaty").
119. Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1006.
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Under the Treaty of Neah Bay, the Makah Tribe has an explicit right
to hunt whales.1 20 In fact, while all treaties in present-day Washington
and Oregon were negotiated by either Governor Stevens (Washington)
or Colonel Palmer (Oregon), the Treaty of Neah Bay is the only one of
these treaties that reserves the right to whale for the Tribe. 121 However,
while they were once prolific whalers, the Makah stopped hunting gray
whales entirely by the mid-1930s in the face of plummeting whale
populations. 122 In the years that followed, the federal government and
international regulatory bodies implemented strict regulations on the
taking of whales.1 23 These conservation efforts resulted in a dramatic
comeback of the California gray whale and its removal from the
endangered species list. 124 Following the delisting, the Makah began
working in conjunction with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) to obtain a subsistence-whaling quota under the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, to which the
25
United States is a signatory.'
In response to these efforts, the plaintiffs in Anderson, most of which
were whale advocacy groups, sued the federal government over its
decision to support the Makah's resumed whaling efforts. 126 The
plaintiffs contended, inter alia,12 7 that the Makah were subject to the
requirements of the federal MMPA. 128 Congress passed the MMPA in
1972 in an effort to provide greater protection to marine mammals,

120. Treaty of Neah Bay, supra note 3, art. 4, 12 Stat. at 940a; see Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d
1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000).
121. Metcalf 214 F.3d at 1140.
122. See id. at 1137.
123. See id. While it is beyond the scope of this Note, and was not raised in the Anderson
proceedings, it could be argued that, in addition to the MMPA, the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, and its domestic
implementing statute, the Whaling Convention Act of 1949 (WCA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 916-9161 (2000),
either modified or abrogated the Makah's treaty whaling right. However, as with the MMPA, there
is no evidence, under the Dion standard, that Congress considered, and chose to abrogate, Indian
treaty whaling rights by passing the WCA. See infra Part IV.C (addressing whether Congress
intended to abrogate the Makah's treaty whaling right by passing the MMPA).
124. See Endangered Fish and Wildlife, 58 Fed. Reg. 3121, 3135 (Jan. 7, 1993).
125. See Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1137.
126. Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002).
127. The plaintiffs also challenged the federal government's approval of the Makah's whaling
plans under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). See id. The court held that the
government violated NEPA by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement before
approving a whaling quota for the tribe. See id. at 1023.
128. Id. at 1009.
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including the gray whale.' 29 While the MMPA imposes a general
moratorium on the taking of marine mammals,' 30 it contains numerous
exceptions to this moratorium, including an exemption for subsistence
takings by certain Alaskan Natives.' 3 ' In addition, the MMPA allows the
NOAA to issue permits for the taking of marine mammals in accordance
with applicable MMPA regulations.132
Neither the statute nor its legislative history mentioned Indian treaty
rights until 1994, when Congress amended the MMPA. 133 Section 14 of
the 1994 Amendments provides that "[n]othing in this Act including any
amendments to the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 made by
this Act alters or is intended to alter any treaty between the United States
and one or more Indian Tribes."' 134 While, on its face, the language of
this provision only applies to the 1994 Amendments, the Senate
Commerce Committee Report for the amendments notes that "the
MMPA does not in any way diminish
or abrogate existing protected
' 35
Indian treaty fishing or hunting rights."'
The Makah argued that the MMPA was inapplicable to the Tribe
because the statute had not abrogated the Makah's explicit treaty right to
hunt whales. 136 Without addressing this defense, the court ruled that the
MMPA must apply to the Makah in order to "effectuate the conservation
purpose of the statute."'' 37 Thus, the court concluded that the NOAA had

129. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (current version
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (2000)). Congress declared that many marine mammal population
stocks were in danger of extreme depletion, even to the point of ceasing to be significant elements
of the ecosystem. As a result, the stated goal of the MMPA was to "obtain an optimum sustainable
population keeping in mind the carrying capacity of the habitat." Id. § 1361(6).
130. Id. § 1371. The provisions of the MMPA only supplement any existing "international treaty,
convention, or agreement, or any statute implementing the same" that otherwise applies to marine
mammal taking. Id. § 1383.
131. Id. § 1374(b)(1).
132. Id.
133. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-238, 108 Stat. 532
(current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1386-1389 (2000)).
134. Id. § 14, 108 Stat. at 558-59 (16 U.S.C. § 1361 historical and statutory notes (2000)).
135. S.REP. No. 103-220, at 17 (1994), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 514, 534.
136. See Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002). The court rejected the tribe's
additional argument that they were exempt from the MMPA because the whaling had been
"expressly provided for by an international treaty, convention, or agreement to which the United
States is a party," finding that the quota agreement with the International Whaling Commission did
not qualify under this provision. Id. at 1023-26.
137. Id. at 1029-30.
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violated federal
law by issuing a whaling permit without complying with
38
the MMPA. 1
In holding that the Makah were subject to the MMPA, the Anderson
court applied Fryberg's conservation necessity test rather than the U.S.
Supreme Court's treaty abrogation test established in Dion. 3 9 Citing
Fryberg, the court concluded that the conservation necessity test applied
to federal conservation statutes, even though it had been developed in
the state regulatory context. 40 Unlike the Fryberg court, however, the
Anderson court did not apply the conservation necessity test in the
context of a larger abrogation analysis.' 41 Instead, it adopted the threepart Fryberg test to hold that the MMPA allows regulation of the
Makah's treaty whaling rights, without considering whether the MMPA
abrogated those rights.142 Under the jurisdictional prong of the Flyberg
test, the court reasoned that because the MMPA extends to "any person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,"' 143 the statute would
apply to the Makah's whaling efforts off the coast of Washington State
and in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. 144 The statute also satisfied Fryberg's
non-discrimination prong because tribal members and non-treaty people
were both subject to identical provisions. 145 Finally, the court held that
the application of the MMPA to the Tribe was necessary to achieve its
conservation purpose. 14 6 Reasoning that Congress was not merely
concerned with the "survival" of marine mammals, but also with
maintaining "optimum sustainable population[s],' 4 7 the court concluded
that the MMPA could not48achieve such objectives without subjecting the
Makah to its provisions.1

138. Id.

139. Id. at 1026.
140. Id. at 1026 n.21.
141. Id. at 1026.
142. See id.

143. 16 U.S.C, § 1372(a)(1) (2000).
144. Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1026. The Strait of Juan de Fuca is the channel of water separating
northwest Washington State from Vancouver Island, Canada.
145. Id.

146. Id. at 1026-28.
147. Id. at 1026-27.
148. Id. The court also rejected contentions by the government and Makah that even if the
Fryberg test was the proper framework for analysis, the Fryberg court's rationale was limited to
cases where species preservation was an issue (it was undisputed that the California gray whale
population was near "carrying capacity"). The court disagreed, and found that the Fryberg test
mandated consideration of the conservation purpose of the statute as a whole, and not a general
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In support of this conclusion, the court offered two scenarios where
the Makah Tribe's unrestricted exercise of its treaty right could
jeopardize the gray whale population. 49 First, the court noted that the
Treaty of Neah Bay contained no explicit limitation on the number of
gray whales the Tribe could take. 150 While the Makah had shown
"admirable restraint"1' 51 in limiting its take to a small number of whales,
and in seeking the approval of the United States, the court expressed
concern that future generations of Makah could decide to take a
significantly larger share of gray whales.15 1 Second, the court stated that
the affirmation of the Makah's right to whale free of MMPA restraints
could trigger other tribes' 53to claim whaling treaty rights under "less
specific treaty language."'
In addition to its analysis of the Makah's treaty right under the
Fryberg framework, the court found that regulating the Tribe's treaty
right under the federal conservation necessity doctrine was consistent
with "the principles embedded in the Treaty of Neah Bay itself., 154 The
court noted that the Makah's treaty right to hunt whales was "in common
with all citizens of the United States."'' 55 According to the court, such
language secures a right to take a "fair share" of the available resource
for both the treaty and non-treaty parties.' 56 Although this logic suggests
that the Makah have a right to take a fair share of the available whales,
the court noted that the non-Indian citizens of Washington State were
unable to exercise their treaty right to take a fair share of the whales
because of MMPA restrictions. 57 This apparent inequity rendered the
right to take a "fair share" of the resource inapplicable to the Makah's
treaty right.'58 Thus, the court concluded that the Makah's fair share

inquiry into issues of species preservation. Id.
149. Id. at 1027-28.

150. Id. at 1027.
151. Id.
152. Id.

153. Id. at 1027-28.
154. Id. at 1028.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1028-29 n.24. In other words, the treaty guarantees Indians not merely the "equal
opportunity" to take fish, but instead "secure the Indians' right to take a share of each run of fish
that passes through tribal fishing areas." See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 676-79 (1978).
157. Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1028-29 n.24.
158. Id.
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under their treaty right to hunt whales in common with the citizens of the
state was "no[t] unrestricted," supporting its conclusion that the Tribe
must comply with the MMPA's permit process. 59
'
IV. THE ANDERSON COURT RELIED ON FLAWED NINTH
CIRCUIT TREATY ABROGATION JURISPRUDENCE IN
HOLDING THAT MAKAH WHALING IS SUBJECT TO THE
MMPA
In Anderson, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed and extended its confused
line of Indian treaty jurisprudence by holding that the MMPA applied to
the Makah's whaling efforts. 60 This error was a result of the court's
previous conflation, in Fryberg, of two analytically distinct U.S.
Supreme Court doctrines: the conservation necessity principle, properly
applied only in cases involving state regulation of treaty rights; and
treaty abrogation principles, properly applied only in cases involving
federal statutes affecting treaty rights. 16' The logic of Fryberg is
unsound, and was implicitly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Dion, where the Court reached the same result as in Fryberg, but without
relying upon the state conservation necessity doctrine. 162 In addition, the
Anderson court compounded the error made in Fryberg by divorcing the
conservation necessity test from the treaty abrogation framework
63
entirely. 1
When analyzed under the correct treaty abrogation analysis
established in Dion, it becomes clear that the MMPA neither modifies
nor abrogates the Makah's treaty right to whale. 164 There is no evidence
that Congress considered Indian treaty rights and chose to abrogate those
rights through the MMPA.165 Given the fundamental importance of
Indian treaty rights, the application of the MMPA to the Makah requires
a greater showing than a finding that unrestricted treaty whaling would
run counter to the MMPA's stated purpose. 166 The Anderson decision's
logic ignored the U.S. Supreme Court's repeated admonition that the
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1028.
161. See supranotes 89-101 and accompanying text.
162. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-45 (1986).
163. See infra notes 188-201 and accompanying text.
164. See infra Part IV.C.

165. See infra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
166. See infra Part IV.C.
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Court will not easily find congressional intent to modify or abrogate
Indian treaty rights.' 67 The Ninth Circuit's decision is contrary to the
treaty abrogation standard established in Dion and should be overturned.
A.

The Anderson Court Improperly Relied on Fryberg, Which Applied
ConservationNecessity Principlesto Its Indian Treaty Abrogation
Analysis Contrary to U.S. Supreme Court Precedent

The Anderson court should not have relied on Fryberg in holding that
the MMPA applied to Makah whaling efforts. The Fryberg court created
and relied upon an improper test for Indian treaty abrogation by
importing and misapplying principles of the state conservation necessity
doctrine. Such an extension of the conservation necessity doctrine serves
only to confuse the traditional Indian treaty abrogation
analysis1 68 and is
69
precedent.'
Court
Supreme
U.S.
by
not supported
While the Fryberg court was properly concerned with determining
whether Congress, in passing the Eagle Protection Act, intended to
modify or abrogate Indian treaty hunting rights, it improperly applied the
state conservation necessity analysis to determine whether such intent
existed in a federal law.17 0 Prior to Fryberg, courts correctly applied the
conservation necessity doctrine exclusively to determine whether states
could regulate certain aspects of treaty rights when necessary for
conservation purposes.' 17 Analysis of state regulation of treaty rights
differs from that of congressional treaty abrogation because of the
dramatically different powers possessed by each sovereign.'72 States
have only a limited ability to regulate Indian treaty rights when
"necessary for conservation," and no ability to abrogate or otherwise
modify these rights. 73 In stark contrast to this limited state power, the
ability of the U.S. Congress to abrogate or modify Indian treaties is
unquestioned. 74 While the fundamental question when analyzing state
regulation is whether the regulation is necessary for conservation, 175 the
167. See infra Part IV.B.
168. See infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
170. See supra Part II.A.
171. See supra Part I.B.
172. See supra Part L.A-B.
173. See supra Part I.B.
174. See supra Part I.A.
175. See supra Part I.B.
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only question in federal
abrogation issues is whether Congress intended
176
to exercise its power.

When a court applies the Fryberg test and finds congressional intent
to abrogate Indian treaty rights implicit in the "general purpose" of a
federal statute, the court eviscerates the logic of the abrogation doctrine.
The general purpose of a federal statute, conservation or otherwise, does
not address the fundamental abrogation question-whether Congress
intended the statute to apply to Indian treaty rights. The Fryberg
approach contradicts the U.S. Supreme Court's admonition that
congressional intent
to modify or abrogate an Indian treaty "is not to be
177
lightly imputed."'

In citing to the line of cases establishing the conservation necessity
doctrine, the Fryberg court focused on the dire conservation threat posed
by unregulated treaty hunting. 178 Quoting Puyallup II, the court noted:
Rights can be controlled by the need to conserve a species ....
The police power of the State is adequate to prevent the
steelhead from following the fate of the passenger pigeon; and
the Treaty does not give the Indians a federal179right to pursue the
last living steelhead until it enters their nets.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court's logic in Puyallup II, developed
exclusively in the context of state regulation, is wholly inapplicable to
the abrogation context. 18° The question in abrogation cases, unlike state
regulation cases, is not whether Congress has the power to affect the
treaty rights-if Congress so chooses, it could completely abrogate all
Indian treaty fishing rights.' 8' Rather, the question is whether Congress
has chosen to exercise that power. The U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that it will only find such intent when there is clear
evidence that Congress considered the treaty right in question and then
chose to abrogate that right.' 82 The Fryberg court failed to recognize this
fundamental distinction.
Most significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court's Dion decision illustrates
the fallacy of the Fryberg court's analysis. 83 The Dion decision, like the
176. See supra Part I.A.

177. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968).
178. See United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 1980).
179. Id. (quoting Puyallup 11,
414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973)).
180. See supra Part I.A.

181. See supra Part I.A.
182. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-40 (1986).
183. See supra Part I.A.
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Fryberg decision, addressed whether Congress intended the Eagle
Protection Act to modify Indian treaty eagle hunting rights.'8 4 In
reaching its conclusion that Congress intended to modify these rights,
the Court found that congressional intent to abrogate was both "strongly
suggested" by the language of the Eagle Protection Act and evident from
the legislative history of the statute. 185 No part of the Dion opinion
discusses the Eagle Protection Act's general "conservation purpose."
Nor does the opinion import the conservation necessity doctrine into its
abrogation analysis. 186 On the contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court
reaffirmed the importance of Indian treaty rights, holding that treaty
abrogation requires "clear evidence that Congress actually considered
the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian
treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating the treaty."' 187 Courts can find such evidence in the statute's
language or legislative history; they cannot find it in a generic
examination of the statute's "conservation purpose."
B.

The Anderson Court Ignored the Abrogation Issue, Compounding
the Fryberg Court's Mistaken Analysis, and Offered Little
Justificationfor a Findingof ConservationNecessity

The Anderson court not only relied on the Fryberg court's flawed
methodology, it also compounded the Fryberg court's error by ignoring
the U.S. Supreme Court's treaty abrogation requirements. 88 In
formulating its novel approach to the analysis of the impact of a federal
conservation statute on Indian treaty rights, the Anderson court cited the
three-part Fryberg test to determine when "reasonable conservation
statutes" affect Indian treaty rights. 89 While the Fryberg court
misapplied the conservation necessity test, it did so in an attempt to
determine whether Congress intended to modify or abrogate Indian

184. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 745.
185. ld. at 740.

186. See supra Part I.A. It is noteworthy that the court did not even cite to Fryberg, in spite of the
fact that the case was featured prominently in the underlying Eighth Circuit's decision, as well as in
the briefs submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court. See United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261 1266-70
(8th Cir. 1985); Brief for the United States at 24, 29, United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986)
(No. 85-246).
187. Dion, 476 U.S. at 740.
188. See supra Part II.B.

189. Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1026 (9th Cir. 2002).
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treaty rights. 190 The Anderson court, by contrast, applied the test to
determine whether the MMPA regulates Makah whaling. 9 ' Without
explanation, the Anderson court held that it need not consider whether
"the MMPA applies by virtue of treaty abrogation."'' 92 The practical
result of the court's decision is that the Makah Tribe has been stripped of
a treaty right without the court having found congressional intent to do
so. Such an analysis is not only inconsistent with established U.S.
Supreme Court Indian treaty abrogation precedent, but also with the
93
methodology of Fryberg.
The Anderson court's contention that the conservation necessity test
is not limited to cases involving state regulations 94 is also erroneous.
The two cases the court cited in support of this proposition, Fryberg and
Eberhardt,195 are simply inapposite. As noted above, the Fryberg court
improperly used the conservation necessity test within the framework of
its abrogation analysis.' 96 Even under its own terms, however, the
Fryberg decision merely stands for the premise that a court may look to
the conservation necessity doctrine in determining whether Congress
intended to modify or abrogate Indian treaty rights. 197 It does not stand
for the proposition that a court may invoke the conservation necessity
principle apart from the abrogation context.
The Anderson court's reliance on Eberhardt for the proposition that
conservation necessity principles are not limited to cases involving state
regulation is equally inappropriate. Although the Eberhardt court
approved of the Fryberg methodology in dicta,' 98 it ultimately
determined the Fryberg test to be inapplicable to administrative
regulations promulgated by the Department of the Interior in its trust
capacity.' 99 While it is doubtful that the court's distinction between

190. See United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010, 1013-16 (9th Cir. 1980).

191. See Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1026-30.
192. Id. at 1029-30.

193. See Fryberg, 622 F.2d at 1013-16 (analyzing conservation necessity test in context of treaty
abrogation analysis).
194. Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1026 n.21.

195. Id. at 1026-28.
196. See supra Part W.A.

197. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
198. See United States v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1986).
199. See id. The Eberhardt court specifically found that "the district court erred in analogizing
this case to the ban on taking bald eagles in Fryberg."Id. at 1361.
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administrative regulations and congressional statutes is valid,2 °°
Eberhardtnonetheless was decided before Dion, and
its dicta cannot be
20 1
read as controlling in light of Dion's methodology.
To justify its holding that the Tribe was subject to the MMPA, the
Anderson court emphasized two possible consequences of unrestricted
Makah whaling. The court first noted that, if left unrestricted, the Makah
would be free to expand whaling activities, perhaps to the point of
202
The court ignored,
"jeopardizing" the gray whale population.
however, the great likelihood that, were the Makah to hunt to the point
of endangering the whale population, Congress would exercise its
plenary authority to modify or abrogate the Makah's treaty right. As
noted, Congress has plenary power to abrogate treaty rights; the only
question is whether Congress has chosen to do so. 20 3 Furthermore, the
empirical basis for this speculation is highly questionable. In five years
of hunting, the Makah have taken one whale.20 4 The assertion that the
Makah would (or could) take enough whales to endanger a species that
is presently "at or near [the ocean's] carrying capacity ' 20 5 is
unsupported.20 6
The Anderson court further asserted that less specific treaty language
than that found in the Treaty of Neah Bay could support the unrestricted
whaling rights by other tribes.20 7 While the treaties of other Pacific Coast
tribes do not contain specific treaty language reserving the right to hunt

200. See, e.g., Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 2002) ("The
Department of the Interior cannot under any circumstances abrogate an Indian treaty directly or
indirectly. Only Congress can abrogate a treaty, and only by making absolutely clear its intention to
do so.") (citing United States v. Washington, 641 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 520 F.2d
676 (9th Cir. 1975)); see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986); Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 670 (1979).
201. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 739-40.
202. Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1027 (9th Cir. 2002).
203. See supra Part I.A.
204. Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1014.
205. Id. at 1010.
206. While it is beyond the scope of this Note, it could be argued that even if the conservation
necessity doctrine had been applied to the Makah's treaty right, the success of the tribal government
in self-regulation would preclude regulation by the federal government. See, e.g., United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 415 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (finding that to regulate for purposes of
conservation necessity the state must show, among other things, that "existing tribal regulation or
enforcement is inadequate to prevent demonstrable harm to the actual conservation of fish"), aff'd,
520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
207. Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1027-28.
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whales, many have reserved "hunting and fishing" rights. 20 8 The court
implied that such "hunting and fishing" rights could, if broadly
construed, include the right to take whales. 20 9 The court reasoned that
granting other Pacific Coast tribes unrestricted whaling rights could
present a serious threat to the survival of the gray whale.21 0
Such a scenario is unlikely for several reasons. First, as noted above,
Congress is free to modify or abrogate any Indian treaty right,21' and
would likely do so should widespread tribal hunting-by the Makah or
any other tribe-endanger the existence of the gray whale. Second, two
government representatives negotiated virtually all of the treaties with
Pacific Coast tribes: Governor Stevens in the Washington Territory, and
Colonel Palmer in the Oregon Territory.2 12 While many of these treaties
reserved the non-exclusive right to "hunt and fish" at usual and
accustomed places, only one-the Treaty of Neah Bay-reserved the
explicit right to whale. 21 3 Arguably, if the general right to hunt and fish
included the right to whale, there would have been no need for the
inclusion of such language in the treaty. While treaty terms are to be
construed "in the sense in which they would naturally be understood" by
the tribes, 21 4 the uniqueness of the whaling language provides a strong
argument that none of the other treaties should be interpreted to include
the reserved right to whale.21 5 The concern of the court seems
unfounded.
The Anderson court provided no additional justification for the use of
the conservation necessity test. That test is not the appropriate method
for analyzing the fundamental Indian treaty abrogation issue presented to
the court. Not only did the court fail to discuss the issue within the Dion
framework, it improperly applied the Fryberg test by completely
ignoring the larger abrogation issue. Given the importance of Indian
treaty rights, such analysis is insufficient.

208. Id.
209. See id.

210. Id.
211. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
212. See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
666 (1979).
213. Treaty of Neah Bay, supra note 3, art. 4, 12 Stat. at 940a.
214. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675-76 (citing Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1898)).
215. This flows from the legal maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" which means that

"to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
602 (7th ed. 1999).
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C.

Under Well-Established U.S. Supreme Court Abrogation Analysis,
the Makah Tribe Is Not Subject to the MMPA

Because the Anderson court's finding that the Makah Tribe was
subject to the MMPA in effect abrogates the Tribe's treaty right to
whale, the court should have determined whether, in passing the MMPA,
Congress intended to abrogate the Makah's treaty whaling rights. The
U.S. Supreme Court's Dion test requires a court to evaluate whether
"clear evidence" exists that Congress considered the conflict between its
intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and
chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty. 216 Such evidence
must be "clear and plain," and found either on the face of the statute or
in the statute's legislative history. 1 7 Under the Dion test, the Ninth
Circuit should have concluded that there was no clear evidence that
Congress intended the MMPA to apply to the Makah.
There is no indication from either the language of the MMPA21 8 or the
statute's legislative history2 19 that Congress considered and chose to
abrogate the Makah's whaling treaty right.220 In fact, until the 1994
Amendments, the MMPA made no mention of any Indian treaty right,
including the Makah's whaling right under the Treaty of Neah Bay. 22'
Far from abrogating Indian treaty rights, the 1994 Amendments
expressly preserved them.22 Section 14 of the 1994 Amendments
provides that "nothing in this Act including any amendments to the
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 made by this Act alters or is
intended to alter any treaty between the United States and one or more
Indian Tribes. 2 23 Congress' stated intent in enacting this disclaimer was
diminish or abrogate
to "reaffirm that the MMPA does not in any way
224
protected Indian treaty fishing or hunting rights.,

216. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 737-39 (1986).

217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (2000).
Dion, 476 U.S. at 739.
Treaty of Neah Bay, supra note 3, art. 4, 12 Stat. at 940a.

221. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (current version
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (2000)).
222. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. 103-238, § 14, 108 Stat. 532,
558-59 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000)).
223. Id.
224. S. REP. No. 103-220, at 17 (1994), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 514, 534.
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Arguably, the MMPA's exemption for Alaska Natives might indicate
that Congress intended the MMPA to apply to all Indian groups except
for Alaska Natives, evincing congressional intent to abrogate the
Makah's treaty whaling right.225 Such a reading, however, is tenuous.
Alaska Natives possess no treaty rights, so it is logical for the MMPA to
contain an explicit exemption for Alaska Natives.226 Any statute of
general applicability passed by Congress would naturally apply to
Alaska Natives were there no exemption.227 Moreover, such a reading of
the statute would effect an abrogation of the Makah's treaty by negative
implication. This falls far short of the "clear evidence" standard of
Dion.228
In sum, there is no evidence in the language and legislative history of
the MMPA that suggests that Congress was even aware of the Makah's
whaling treaty right, much less that it considered the right and intended
the MMPA to abrogate it. In fact, there is a strong indication that
Congress did not wish to abrogate any Indian treaty rights by enacting
the MMPA. In the absence of a finding of intention to abrogate, the Dion
decision requires that the treaty right be preserved. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has noted on many occasions,229 such treaty rights are too
fundamental for the courts to so easily discard.
V.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Anderson, the Makah's
right to take whales under the Treaty of Neah Bay is unfettered by the
MMPA. The Anderson court misapplied its own faulty precedent in

225. See, e.g., United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1490-92 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (concluding
that certain exclusions for indigenous Alaskans in the Endangered Species Act indicated
congressional intent not to exempt other Indians, thereby effecting an abrogation of Indian treaty
rights).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 663 (D. Minn. 1991).
227. This seems particularly true given that just one year prior to passing the MMPA, Congress
had extinguished all claims based on "aboriginal right, title, use, or occupancy of land or water areas
in Alaska" by passing the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688
(codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628). At least, it indicates that Congress was well aware of the
non-treaty status of Alaska natives. See also Bresette, 761 F. Supp. at 663 (holding that a similar
exception for Alaska natives in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act did not abrogate Indian treaty rights
and stating that "[t]o treat the consideration of indigenous Alaskans' rights as the consideration of
Native American treaty rights nationwide, for the simple reason that both groups are regarded as
Indians, is disingenuous").
228. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740-41 (1986).
229. See, e.g., id. at 739 ("Indian treaty rights are too fundamental to be easily cast aside.").
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Fryberg in erroneously concluding that Congress intended to regulate
Makah whaling through the MMPA. The Fryberg court, implicitly
overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dion, mistakenly incorporated
the conservation necessity doctrine into treaty abrogation analysis. The
conservation necessity doctrine properly applies only to state regulation
of Indian treaty fishing. It is not relevant to the question of whether
federal statutes affect Indian fishing rights. Furthermore, the Anderson
court compounded the Fryberg court's error by failing even to consider
the abrogation issue. Instead, the Anderson court relied solely on the
conservation necessity doctrine in holding that the MMPA must apply to
the Makah's whaling efforts.
The correct treaty abrogation analysis is found in Dion: There must be
clear and plain evidence that Congress considered the treaty right in
question, and subsequently chose to modify or abrogate that right. There
is no evidence that Congress, in passing the MMPA, considered and then
chose to abrogate the Makah's treaty right to whale. Thus, under Dion,
the Makah's treaty right remains unaffected by the MMPA. If Congress
decides that the MMPA should regulate Makah whaling, it is free to do
so through statutory enactment. Until Congress passes such legislation,
however, the United States is bound by its treaty obligation to the
Makah. The Anderson decision should be overturned.
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